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ABSTRACT
The state of Mississippi’s historically high incarceration rate peaked in the year
2013, when it was the second highest nationwide. To combat this problem, House Bill
585 was passed into law in 2014. The law consisted of multiple reforms, which were part
of an effort to toughen sentencing for violent offenders and reduce severity of
punishment for non-violent criminals, with the aim of reducing incarceration and
refocusing prison space for violent crimes. I employed difference in differences and
synthetic control methododologies to examine the effects of House Bill 585 on crime and
imprisonment rates. My results revealed that House Bill 585 caused an initial sharp
decline in imprisonment rate, but the effect wore off as time progressed. The impact of
House Bill 585 on violent crime was insignificant at all levels, and the law led to an
increase in property crime rate, which also became less significant over time.
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INTRODUCTION
In the year 2013, the state of Mississippi had the second-highest incarceration rate
in the nation, with the prison population having grown by approximately 17% in the
preceding decade (Cate, 2021). These startling statistics prompted the government of
Mississippi to take a step back and re-examine the correctional system and criminal laws
that were currently in place. A Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force was created
with the goal of identifying areas of needed reform in Mississippi’s prison systems, in
hopes of saving taxpayers a significant amount of money in the years to come (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2014). House Bill 585 was thus created as a result and enacted into law
in 2014, with the aim of reducing incarceration. Among the reforms created by H.B. 585
was the tiering of drug offenses, the increasing of the felony theft threshold from $500 to
$1000, and the establishment of a true minimum of time served for those convicted of
violent and nonviolent crimes before becoming eligible for parole or early release (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2014).
This paper will address the portion of House Bill 585 that requires nonviolent
offenders to serve a minimum of 25% of their sentences and violent offenders to serve a
minimum of 50% before being eligible for early release and will examine how these
minimums affect crime and incarceration rates. The existing literature related to House
Bill 585 generally supports the notion that the law was effective only in the short-run and
has had no significant long-term impacts. Previous findings have suggested that
minimum time served laws generally lead to higher imprisonment rates (which H.B. 585
is attempting to prevent), but this may not be the case in Mississippi, where the time
served minimum of H.B. 585 decreases the required length of sentence serving for non1

violent criminals (Latino, 2020). This portion of the bill is referred to in Cate (2021) as a
“split policy verdict” law, because the implementation of these minimums leads to
tougher sentences for violent criminals and reduced sentences for non-violent criminals.
Similarly to Barati (2018) and Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), I will be utilizing the
synthetic control method, along with the difference-in-differences method, to discover
how time-served minimums impact prison population growth and crime. Theoretically, if
there was previously no true minimum in place, requiring that violent criminal offenders
remain in jail for a specified amount of time, rather than being eligible for extremely
early release, etc., should lead to greater prison populations but decreased crime rates in
regards to violent crimes/criminals, as incapacitation leads to crime reduction by
rendering criminals incapable of reoffending or harming the community outside of the
prison (Piquero & Blumstein, 2007). On the other hand, instituting a 25% minimum for
non-violent criminals, when the previous minimum was a year, should lead to greater
non-violent crime rates but lower incarceration rates for non-violent criminals. Because
the majority of prison space in Mississippi was occupied primarily by non-violent
criminals prior to 2014 (Cate, 2021), House Bill 585 should lead to a decline in the total
prison population. Additionally, implementation of minimum time served laws and
increasing of crime severity can reduce recidivism (Johnson, 2019).
By studying House Bill 585, this paper will specifically highlight the case of
Mississippi, a state in which there is sparse existing literature related to the prison system,
as Mississippi consistently lacks on crime reform in comparison to other states nationwide (Latino, 2020). Cate (2021) negatively states that H.B. 585 has continued mass
incarceration at cheaper rates, but this may not necessarily be a bad thing if violent crime
2

is reduced at a greater rate, therefore reducing social costs and taxpayer expenses.
Additionally, it should be noted that it will be difficult to distinguish between the effects
of incapacitation and deterrence when examining crime reduction via minimum time
served laws. Implementing a true time-served minimum for violent criminals when the
previous minimum was not enforced should lead to decreased violent crime rates and a
refocusing of prison space on violent offenders. However, Cate (2021) points to the fact
that even if House Bill 585 was initially able to accomplish this refocusing of prison
space on violent criminals, Mississippi is still continuing to fall behind in crime reform
and argues that House Bill 585 does not/will not have a significant effect on incarceration
or crime rates over a long period of time.
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POLICY BACKGROUND
As a result of the alarming crime rates in the state of Mississippi, a Corrections
and Criminal Justice Task Force consisting of law enforcement officers, Mississippi
legislators, attorneys, and more was assembled to propose reforms and attempt to discern
the causes of the ever-increasing prison population (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). The
Task Force produced three main findings: nonviolent offenders accounted for a
significant portion of the incarcerated, minimal prison alternatives were available for
courts, and sentence lengths had been heightened in recent years. The Task Force then
provided 19 policy recommendations aimed at placing an emphasis on incarceration of
career and violent criminals, rather than first-time nonviolent offenders as well as
decreasing recidivism rates, and providing better incarceration alternatives (Mississippi
Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force, 2013).
Thus, House Bill 585 was proposed and enacted into law in March of 2014 after a
105-13 vote in the Mississippi House of Representatives and a unanimous vote in the
Senate (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). House Bill 585 was first and foremost a way to
produce budget cuts in Mississippi’s criminal justice system by reducing the sheer
number of people incarcerated, but Cate (2021) argues that it rather enables “mass
incarceration on the cheap.” With inmates tending to cost American taxpayers between
approximately $30,000 and $60,000 per year per person (Henrichsen & Delaney, 2012),
House Bill 585 promised to save taxpayers as much as $266 million dollars over the
course of the seceding decade. Among the changes to the criminal justice system enacted
by H.B. 585 included the aforementioned true time served minimums, as an attempt to
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reserve prison space for violent and career criminals, and more (Pew Charitable Trusts,
2014).
Prior to 2014, Mississippi’s laws regarding minimum time served requirements
for violent and non-violent offenders varied distinctly from the 25%-50% requirements
instituted as a result of House Bill 585. Before House Bill 585, violent criminals did not
have a true time served minimum and were eligible for early supervised release, intensive
supervised release, and unadjudicated probation, barring certain extenuating
circumstances or crimes (Coxwell Law, 2014) Additionally, non-violent criminals were
required to serve a minimum of one year before becoming eligible for parole, so an
individual sentenced for a non-violent crime to a year in prison would have had to serve
the entirety of his sentence (Coxwell Law, 2014). After House Bill 585, the 50%
minimum was put into place for violent offenses, and violent criminals were ineligible for
intensive supervised release and unadjudicated probation. The true time served minimum
was reduced from one year for non-violent criminals to 25%, once again, in an attempt to
“toughen up” on violent crime specifically. However, one of the most widely
acknowledged drawbacks and flaws of House Bill 585 is that it does not apply to
criminals convicted prior to 2014, leading to the possibility of individuals convicted of
identical crimes in different years to differ greatly in terms of parole/release eligibility,
spurring inevitable questions of fairness and equity.

5

LITERATURE REVIEW
In the existing literature regarding the economics of crime and the efficiency of
incarceration rates and lengths, Becker (1968) provides a sufficient foundation for the
examination of tradeoffs related to crime. He believed that crime could be reduced by
increasing the costs of committing crimes or decreasing the potential benefits of crime.
The two ways to increase costs, which are often considered more feasible than reducing
benefits, are increasing the certainty/probability of crime apprehension or increasing the
severity of punishment for criminal activity. There is significant disagreement amongst
those in the world of criminal justice and economics in terms of the varying importance
of certainty vs. severity. Antunes & Hunt (1973) and Mathur (1978) posit that certainty is
much more successful in preventing crime than severity. Nagin (2013) and Loughran
(2011) also support the notion that certainty has a significant effect on crime reduction.
Killias (2009) finds it to be a nonlinear deterrent of crime, meaning that the probability of
an offender being incarcerated for a crime does not proportionally affect crime rate.
Opponents of this view argue that severity plays just as much, if not more, of a significant
role in reducing crime as certainty (Friesen, 2012; Lee & McCrary, 2009; Landerso,
2015).
Becker (1968) states that certainty and severity of punishments could either have
an incapacitation effect or a deterrent effect, where the former prevents criminals from
committing additional crimes by being physically incapable due to incarceration and the
latter discourages individuals from engaging in criminal activity to avoid the
repercussions and societal sanctions of these actions. The deterrent effect aims to “deter”
individuals from committing offenses by setting penalties that are proportional to the
6

magnitude of the crime (Johnson, 2019). The economic framework upon which this
notion is based are the theories of utility maximization and cost-benefit analysis,
assuming that an individual will be willing to commit a crime if the benefits and/or utility
received from this action outweigh the costs (Bushway & Reuter, 2008). Decker &
Kohfield (1990) emphasizes the importance of both certainty and severity as components
of the deterrent effect. Gibbs (1968) reports a significant, inverse relationship between
sentence length and crime, thus offering support for the deterrent effect. Also, in support
of this effect are Tittle & Rowe (1974) and Abrams (2012), which examines the effects of
add-on gun laws on gun violence and finds that these laws deter gun violence by
approximately 5%. May (2014) focuses on habitual crime and the three-strike rule in
California, which is currently implemented in Mississippi as well, and finds that the law
has a deterrent effect for criminals with two previous felonies but does not have an
overall deterrent effect on the general population. Another means through which
incarceration can prevent crime is the incapacitation effect, which occurs by physically
separating criminals from society, thus rendering them incapable of committing further
crimes (Greenberg, 1975; Bhati, 2007; Levitt, 1996; Barbarino & Mastrobuoni, 2014).
Piquero & Blumstein (2007) finds that the incapacitation effect may reduce crime in a
greater magnitude than the deterrent effect.
Despite plentiful evidence in support of increasing severity and certainty of
punishments in order to reduce crime, longer incarceration may not actually be socially
optimal or economically efficient. Donohue III (2007) discusses the possibility of optimal
levels of incarceration but determines that further research is needed regarding the extent
of the social costs of incarceration. Ganong (2012) argues that the costs of incarceration
7

outweigh the overall benefits of incapacitation, and Barati (2018) finds that milder
punishments for lower-level crimes may be more economically efficient than
punishments of greater severity. Furthermore, greater severity is often associated with
greater recidivism and increased prison populations, along with increased demand for
prison space (Drago, 2016; Cloninger, 1996). Due to the costs of incarceration often
extending to social and implicit costs and surpassing state and local budgets, severity of
punishment should be proportional to the costs of incarceration in order to maintain fiscal
responsibility (Ross & Katzenelson, 1999; Henrichsen & Delaney, 2012).
Chen & Shapiro (2015) examines the effects of poor prison conditions and
increased sentence lengths on crime and finds a significant association with increased
recidivism. Poor prison conditions are often the result of budget cuts and attempts by
state and local governments to save money, which often coincide with attempts to reduce
the prison population. In 2019, the United States’ incarceration rate dropped to its lowest
point since 1995, following many years of increasing imprisonment levels (Gramlich,
2021). However, in 2020, the US still maintained the highest incarceration rate in
comparison with all other countries worldwide, with an average of 665 individuals
incarcerated per 100,000 people (Simpson, 2020). While some theories state that
increasing the prison population decreases crime by taking criminals off the streets, this
has not necessarily been the case for the United States. In recent years, states across the
US have begun attempting to reduce their prison populations in hopes of saving money
and cutting prison budgets (Siebrase, 2022). However, the results of Chen & Shapiro
(2015) suggest that budget cuts leading to worsening prison conditions may actually be
associated with increases in the prison population, instead. Cate (2021) discusses House
8

Bill 585 that was passed in Mississippi in 2014 and posits that this bill has not decreased
incarceration by a significant amount. Furthermore, the fiscally responsible approach
assumed by the Mississippi government in this case is leading to declining prison
conditions, the transitioning to different types of criminal activity, and an increasing need
for investment in public goods/works.
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Due to the reforms of House Bill 585 applying only to the state of Mississippi,
rather than all 50 states, I deemed the difference-in-differences method to be appropriate
for use in this paper. The difference-in-differences method is typically used when specific
groups are treated, but others are not (Schwerdt & Woessmann, 2020). Difference-indifferences is also commonly utilized when the issue at hand is of a political nature
(Angrist & Krueger, 1999). The model estimates changes over time, in which no groups
are treated in the first period, and one or more groups are treated in the next period and
compared to a control group. Therefore, the effects of the treatment variable should then
be observable. A sample regression equation is as follows:

𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒! ) = 𝛽" + 𝛽# 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛿𝑋! + 𝜀! .

I chose to use a logarithmic model in order to better interpret the effects of
dependent variables on crime rate and express these effects as a percentage. In this
equation, Crime represents the outcome variables violent crime, property crime, and
imprisonment rate. Treatment is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the observation is
affected by House Bill 585 (alternatively expressed as observations for the state of
Mississippi from 2014-2019). The variable X represents a number of demographic factors
that could influence crime, such as population, gender, age, race, etc. I have also included
state and year fixed effect variables in my regressions.
However, the difference-in-differences method is not exactly a perfect match for
the issue in question because Mississippi is the only treated group out of all 50 states,
10

meaning there are 49 different control groups. Some of these states, such as New York,
are not comparable to Mississippi due to extreme crime rate and demographic
differences. To combat this problem of incomparability of crime in Mississippi versus
more populous states, I have continued the difference-in-differences model with only
states that are more demographically similar. I ran separate difference-in-differences
regressions with the Southern states1 as the control states. I also utilized another method,
the synthetic control method (SCM), which has previously been deemed more suitable
for determining the effects of a law such as House Bill 585 (Barati, 2018). This model
was first conducted in Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), and Abadie (2021) discusses its
uses and applications. SCM is often employed with panel data sets and is used to examine
the effects of an intervention, in this case, House Bill 585. A counterfactual synthetic
control is then created using an optimization method and pre-treatment predictors to
assign weights to appropriate control groups, in this case, states. By comparing the
treated group to the synthetic control group, we can more clearly and accurately depict
the effects of the intervention/treatment (Abadie, 2021).
The data I utilized in this paper is panel data obtained via FBI public databases
and includes figures related to imprisonment rates, violent crime rates, and property
crime rates. Demographic data was retrieved from the US Census Bureau. The time
period accounted for ranges from 2005 to 2019, which is comprised of nine years prior to
the passing of House Bill 585 and six years after. Table 1 in Appendix A displays mean

Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Virginia
West Virginia, Maryland, and Oklahoma
11
1

and standard deviation values for the variables included in the difference-in-differences
regressions.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In regards to the difference-in-differences regressions with all 50 U.S. states, the
treatment variable representing House Bill 585 led to a 10.98% decrease in imprisonment
rate, on average. This value was statistically significant at all levels. However, much of
this effect could be encompassed by the sharp decline in 2014, the year the law was
passed. The passing of H.B. 585 led to a 2.36% decrease in the violent crime rate, on
average, but this value was not statistically significant. Property crime saw an average
increase of 7.74% as a result of House Bill 585, which was statistically significant at all
levels, as well. Table 2 in Appendix A presents these regression coefficients for the
treatment variable and the other demographic variables. For the difference-in-differences
regressions with Southern states only, the effects of House Bill 585 on the three outcome
variables were similar to the regressions with all states, but with different magnitudes.
H.B. 585 led to a decrease in imprisonment rate by 14.6% and violent crime rate by
8.2%, on average, with the former being statistically significant at all levels and the latter
once again being statistically insignificant. The effect of H.B. 585 on property crime rate
was a 5.66% increase that was statistically significant at a 5% level. These regression
results, depicted in Table 3 of Appendix A, support our initial hypothesis that
imprisonment rate will show an initial decline, and property crime rate will increase in
Mississippi in the years after the passing of H.B. 585.
The pool for the synthetic control group consisted of every U.S. state except
Mississippi. Predictor variables and lagged outcome variables produced a synthetic
control with varying weights for appropriate states, with regards to each specific outcome
variable. Mississippi is referred to in the graphs as the treated unit. Figure 1 depicts the
13

behavior of Mississippi and the synthetic control group pre-treatment and post-treatment
for the outcome variable Imprisonment Rate, measured per 100,000 people.
Figure 1: SCM Graph for Imprisonment Rate per 100,000 People

As you can see, the synthetic control unit and treated unit (Mississippi) follow similar
paths until the year 2014, when House Bill 585 was passed. We see a sharp drop from
2013 to 2014 in imprisonment rate in Mississippi, likely caused by the large increase in
non-violent criminals eligible for parole as a result of the 25% true time served minimum.
However, we see much less drastic results in the following years, with Mississippi’s
imprisonment rate eventually surpassing the treatment group in 2019, indicating that the
effects of House Bill 585 wore off over time.
Figure 2 displays the trends for Mississippi and the synthetic control for the
variable Violent Crime Rate, which is also measured per 100,000 people.

14

Figure 2: SCM Graph for Violent Crime Rate per 100,000 People

The effects of House Bill 585 on violent crime look to be insignificant, barring the year
2018, in which Mississippi experienced an abnormally low level of violent crime. The
significant decline in 2018 appears to be unrelated to H.B. 585, and the most probable
explanation for this anomaly is an error in data reported by Mississippi’s police
department, although this cannot be proven. Robertson (2019) cites the passing of a
federal law that could have affected violent crime in Mississippi in 2018, but this would
not explain the lack of such a significant decline for other states. The negative effect of
House Bill 585 on violent crime rate is likely due in part to the decrease in 2018 and may
have been even more insignifant in the absence of this data anomaly.
The SCM results for the final outcome variable, property crime rate per 100,000
people, are shown in Figure 3 on the following page.

15

Figure 3: SCM Graph for Property Crime Rate per 100,000 People

Prior to 2014, Mississippi and the synthetic control unit experienced very similar trends
in property crime rate. Following the passing of H.B. 585, Mississippi’s trend line jumps
above the synthetic control group, and the treatment effect can be estimated by the
difference between the two curves. As expected and supported by the DiD regressions,
House Bill 585 led to an increase in property crime for the state of Mississippi in
comparison to the control states.
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CONCLUSION
House Bill 585 was created as a result of the recommended policy reforms of the
2014 Mississippi Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force. It aimed to save
Mississippi taxpayers as much as $266 million in the decade following the passage of the
bill by reducing the state’s staggeringly high incarceration rate. Among the critical
reforms included in the bill was the implementation of a true time served minimum of
25% of the sentence for non-violent crimes and 50% of the sentence for violent crimes.
This minimum was part of an effort to refocus Mississippi’s prison space on violent
criminals by toughening up on violent crime and reducing punishments for non-violent
crimes. The law was passed in March 2014 and was applicable to any criminal convicted
of a crime in 2014 or later.
Although H.B. 585 attempted to take a step in the right direction, Cate (2021)
argues that this step was too small, as Mississippi continues to fall behind on crime
reform in comparison to the rest of the nation. Cate (2021) also stated that the law would
not be effective in the long run in terms of reducing incarceration in the state. From the
difference in differences regressions, we saw that imprisonment rate in Mississippi
sharply decreased in the year the law was passed, but this effect wore off, and
imprisonment eventually began to increase once more. The impact of House Bill 585 on
violent crime was insignificant when comparing Mississippi both with the rest of the U.S.
and with a selected few Southern states. Because H.B. 585 increased severity of crime for
violent criminals, the desired deterrent effect would be a decrease in violent crimes, but
in line with Cate (2021), this effect did not occur. For property crime rate, an increase
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occurred as a result of the passing of House Bill 585, and the statistical significance of
this increase varied when including 49 control states versus only Southern control states.
The synthetic control graphs told a story very similar to that of the DiD
regressions. The significant decrease in imprisonment rate was largely attributed to the
first year in which H.B. 585 was passed. The decrease in violent crime, albeit
insignificant, was influenced by the abnormal and unexplained large drop in Mississippi
violent crime in the year 2018. Property crime increased initially in Mississippi in the
year the law was passed and continued to trend above the synthetic control group for the
next five years. In conclusion, House Bill 585 was impactful only in the short-term in
initially decreasing incarceration. However, this decline did not persist for the following
years, and violent crime did not significantly decrease in the manner which the
Corrections and Criminal Justice Task Force anticipated. These results support the
assertions made in Cate (2021) that House Bill 585 was not effective in the long run, and
Mississippi must continue to make further reforms to improve its incarceration and crime
rates.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Yearly Crime/Imprisonment
Rates Defined per 100,000
People:
Imprisonment
Violent Crime
Murder
Robbery
Rape
Aggravated Assault
Property Crime
Theft
Burglary
Vehicle Theft
Population Characteristics:
State Population
Population per Square Mile
Male Population
Female Population
Race, Age, and Sex Data (As a
Percentage of the Population):
White
Black
Hispanic
Other Race
Female
Male
Younger than 15
Age 15-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
Older than 65
Unemployment Rate:

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750

388.45
374.35
4.51
88.69
37.54
243.61
2743.37
1925.23
577.90
240.24

138.45
152.60
2.30
50.04
15.73
113.41
729.05
447.53
238.20
132.13

750
750
750
750

6251954
196.81
3075934
3176020

6929862
260.17
3421201
3509238

750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750

80.23
10.78
10.93
8.99
50.62
49.38
19.39
13.89
13.24
12.91
13.87
12.38
14.31
2.83

12.26
9.54
10.01
10.28
0.76
0.76
1.79
0.90
1.00
1.00
1.27
1.29
2.24
1.06
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Table 2: DiD Regression with All States
Variable

Imprisonment

Violent Crime

Property Crime

House Bill 585

-0.1098***
(0.0347)

-0.0236
(0.0430)

0.0774***
(0.0283)

Population Density

-0.0026**
(0.0011)

-0.0057***
(0.0015)

-0.0030***
(0.0010)

Male Median Age

3.9702**
(1.6527)

4.4764
(3.8747)

3.2993
(2.3712)

Female Median Age

-3.1510*
(1.7904)

-2.2964
(2.5545)

-3.8890
(2.4882)

Younger than 15

0.5107
(1.0532)

-0.5893
(1.2794)

-1.3681
(1.3379)

Age 15-24

-0.1266
(0.7104)

0.7477
(0.9737)

-0.9184
(0.8036)

Age 25-34

-0.6830
(0.7258)

0.4328
(1.1665)

-0.7945
(0.9199)

Age 35-44

-0.7300*
(0.4066)

0.2324
(0.4482)

0.0994
(0.4409)

Age 45-54

-0.7309*
(0.3854)

-0.3305
(0.4451)

0.3992
(0.4073)

Age 55-64

-1.1630**
(0.4347)

-0.4057
(0.6554)

-0.6792
(0.4744)

White

0.6644
(1.1200)

0.2908
(1.5333)

-1.9628
(1.1775)

Black

0.0842
(0.0930)

0.2933*
(0.1580)

-0.1019
(0.1005)

Hispanic

-0.0150
(0.1906)

0.3244
(0.2431)

0.4971**
(0.2272)

Other Race

0.1827
(0.2145)

-0.6505*
(0.3869)

-0.6113***
(0.2284)

Female Officer

0.0676
(0.0700)

0.1646*
(0.0982)

0.0740
(0.0701)

Male Officer

0.7366*
(0.3741)

-0.1430
(0.7302)

0.0547
(0.4198)

Female Population

71.1792
(73.0528)

-157.6368
(108.5549)

-224.3316**
(89.2784)

Male Population

78.0221
(73.1077)

-144.9624
(108.1435)

-210.3244**
(85.7775)

Unemployment

0.0387
(0.0475)

-0.0505
(0.0667)

0.0008
(0.0490)

Female Civilian

0.1302
(0.1528)

0.0786
(0.2014)

0.2174
(0.1566)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Male Civilian

0.1326*
(0.0686)

-0.0237
(0.1248)

-0.0172
(0.0724)

Constant

-580.1327
(573.7966)

1181.982
(848.3617)

1727.504
(689.3833)

*denotes significance at p=.10 ** denotes significance at p=.05 *** denotes significance at p=.01
Standard Error values

Table 3: DiD Regressions with Southern States Only
Variable

Imprisonment

Violent Crime

Property Crime

-0.1460***
(0.0332)

-0.0821
(0.0906)

0.05663**
(0.0256)

Population Density

-0.00002
(0.0049)

-0.0113
(0.0089)

-0.0006
(0.0024)

Male Median Age

6.4771
(4.8670)

2.2890
(8.3116)

-0.5661
(2.6083)

Female Median Age

-3.1007
(4.9732)

-3.8789
(4.6845)

4.0844
(3.1217)

Younger than 15

-3.3638
(3.7883)

-3.4207
(5.0838)

4.9547
(2.8364)

Age 15-24

1.4816
(1.5238)

-0.5631
(2.1664)

1.9828
(1.3222)

Age 25-34

1.6709
(1.3965)

-0.3995
(1.9039)

1.7879
(1.0003)

Age 35-44

3.2379*
(1.7966)

1.0365
(2.2518)

1.7575*
(0.9294)

Age 45-54

0.8842
(2.5481)

-0.5146
(2.1676)

1.1877
(1.3229)

Age 55-64

-4.2256*
(2.2450)

-0.3309
(2.1768)

2.4703**
(0.9973)

White

-5.7640
(3.7873)

-4.1647
(4.1878)

3.5855
(2.1254)

Black

0.3218
(1.0874)

-0.3947
(1.5597)

-0.3830
(0.6073)

Hispanic

0.3002
(0.6133)

0.2220
(0.7629)

-0.0906
(0.3436)

Other Race

0.3173
(0.8440)

0.7719
(0.9159)

0.1928
(0.3089)

House Bill 585
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Table 3 (Continued)
Female Officer

0.1940*
(0.0966)

0.1436
(0.0905)

-0.0110
(0.0601)

Male Officer

1.2754
(0.8025)

0.6610
(0.9938)

-0.7777*
(0.4076)

Female Population

-621.8004
(923.7993)

-454.6249
(964.5863)

-9.2251
(364.0819)

Male Population

-566.2549
(882.0833)

-423.8971
(931.9115)

-13.2045
(348.2886)

Unemployment

-0.0809
(0.0551)

-0.0347
(0.1273)

0.0267
(0.0313)

Female Civilian

0.3537**
(0.1219)

0.1109
(0.2193)

-0.1437
(0.1113)

Male Civilian

0.2250
(0.1360)

0.1687
(0.1239)

-0.0425
(0.0649)

3662.055
(7042.163)

3476.958
(7423.95)

32.3511
(2774.638)

Constant

*denotes significance at p=.10 ** denotes significance at p=.05 *** denotes significance at p=.01
Standard Error values
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